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This article explores the following methodological principle for theory construction in physics: if an
ontological theory predicts two scenarios that are ontologically distinct but empirically indiscernible,
then this theory should be rejected and replaced by one relative to which the scenarios are
ontologically the same. I defend the thesis that this methodological principle was first articulated
by Leibniz as a version of his principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and that it was applied
repeatedly to great effect by Einstein in his development of the special and general theories of
relativity. I argue for an interpretation of the principle as an inference to the best explanation,
defend it against some criticisms, discuss its potential applications in modern physics, and explain
how it provides an attractive middle ground in the debate between empiricist and realist philosophies
of science.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article concerns the version of Leibniz’s principle
of the identity of indiscernible that is found in the
Leibniz-Clarke correspondence [1]. The following
quotation, point 6 of the 4th letter of the correspondence,
highlights the usefulness of the principle in the debate
regarding whether motion is absolute or relative:
To suppose two things indiscernible, is to
suppose the same thing under two names.
And therefore to suppose that the universe
could have had at first another position of
time and place, than that which it actually
had; and yet that all the parts of the universe
should have had the same situation among
themselves, as that which they actually had;
such a supposition, I say, is an impossible
fiction.
I take Leibniz to be using his principle of the
identity of indiscernibles here as a normative maxim, a
methodological principle that guides the construction of
physical theories. Specifically, I take the maxim at play
to be that the ontological account of two hypothetical
scenarios or phenomena ought to be the same whenever
the empirical (or equivalently operational) account of
these phenomena is the same.
More explicitly, the principle that I wish to endorse,
and to which I want to claim Leibniz as the progenitor,
is as follows:
The Leibnizian methodological
principle
If an ontological theory implies the
existence of two scenarios that are
empirically indistinguishable in principle
but ontologically distinct (where both the
indistinguishability and distinctness are
evaluated by the lights of the theory in
question), then the ontological theory should
be rejected and replaced with one relative
to which the two scenarios are ontologically
identical.
Heuristically, the principle asserts the ontological
identity of empirical indiscernibles. In previous work
discussing the principle [2], I attributed it to Einstein
(for reasons that will become apparent), but I shall here
argue that it should be attributed to Leibniz.
It is reasonable to wonder whether adding the
“ontological” and “empirical” qualifiers to the notions
of “identity” and “indiscernibility” in Leibniz’s principle
of the identity of indiscernibles, and casting it as
a methodological principle for theory construction
constitutes a significant departure from what Leibniz
had in mind. In fact, the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence
supports the thesis that Leibniz endorsed this reading, at
least in the context of the debate on the nature of space
and motion.1
For instance, in point 52 of the 5th letter, Leibniz
recapitulates his argument to Clarke as follows:
’tis unreasonable it [the universe] should have
any motion otherwise than as its parts change
their situation among themselves; because
such a motion would produce no change that
could be observed, and would be without
design.
He then paraphrases Clarke’s prior response to this
argument as follows:
1 Sklar [3] has argued that one should read Leibniz’s principle
of the identity of indiscernibles as ontological identity given
indiscernibility “relative to all qualitative properties”. However,
it is quite unclear what is meant by “qualitative property”.
Furthermore, I see no evidence in Leibniz’s discussion of the
absolute-relative debate that he had in mind indiscernibility
relative to some distinguished type of property, and much
evidence that he had in mind empirical indistinguishability.
Indeed, Sklar also ultimately concludes that the only sensible
notion of indiscernibility for Leibniz’s argument is the empirical
one. It seems to me that this is in fact the only reading that is
supported by the textual evidence.
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2the reality of motion does not depend upon
being observed; and that a ship may go
forward, and yet a man, who is in the ship,
may not perceive it.
To which he provides the following rebuttal:
I answer, motion does not indeed depend
upon being observed; but it does depend
upon being possible to be observed. [...] when
there is no change that can be observed, there
is no change at all.
His conclusion in this argument, that it is unreasonable
to assign reality to the distinction between the universe
being globally in motion and being globally at rest (as
opposed to the universe undergoing relative motions
among its parts), i.e., his denial of the “reality of motion”
in this case, is an affirmation of the ontological identity
of the two imagined scenarios. Meanwhile, the latter
two quotes make it clear that his justification for this
conclusion is explicitly the empirical indiscernibility of
the two imagined scenarios (that is, the impossibility
of discernment by observation), and in particular their
in-principle empirical indiscernibility, rather than a
parochial observer-dependent or technology-dependent
species of empirical indiscernibility.
I now turn to arguing for the credentials of this
principle in physics. Despite the fact that physicists
do not explicitly champion this principle—indeed, they
do not seem to even know about it—I will argue that
Einstein made use of it at several critical junctures in
his development of the special and general theories of
relativity.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LEIBNIZIAN
METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE IN
EINSTEIN’S WORK
A. The induction experiment
Consider the introductory paragraph to Einstein’s
1905 paper “On the electrodynamics of moving bodies”[4]
which introduced the special theory of relativity:
It is known that Maxwell’s
electrodynamics—as usually understood
at the present time—when applied to
moving bodies, leads to asymmetries
which do not appear to be inherent in
the phenomena. Take, for example, the
reciprocal electrodynamic action of a
magnet and a conductor. The observable
phenomenon here depends only on the
relative motion of the conductor and the
magnet, whereas the customary view draws
a sharp distinction between the two cases in
which either the one or the other of these
bodies is in motion. For if the magnet
is in motion and the conductor at rest,
there arises in the neighbourhood of the
magnet an electric field with a certain
definite energy, producing a current at the
places where parts of the conductor are
situated. But if the magnet is stationary and
the conductor in motion, no electric field
arises in the neighbourhood of the magnet.
In the conductor, however, we find an
electromotive force, to which in itself there
is no corresponding energy, but which gives
rise—assuming equality of relative motion in
the two cases discussed—to electric currents
of the same path and intensity as those
produced by the electric forces in the former
case.
Einstein is here emphasizing that relative to the
understanding of electrodynamics that prevailed at the
time, scenarios involving different motions relative to the
ether, such as the two scenarios depicted in Fig 1, were
considered to be physically distinct and yet generated
precisely the same observable phenomenon. Specifically,
in the scenario where the conducting loop is at rest with
respect to the ether while the bar magnet is moving
relative to it, the static charges in the loop feel a
time-varying magnetic field, hence an electric field, which
induces a current. By contrast, in the scenario where the
conducting loop is moving with respect to the ether while
the bar magnet is stationary relative to it, the charges in
the loop are in motion through a static magnetic field,
and the associated Lorentz force induces a current. As
Einstein emphasizes, if the relative motion is the same
in the two scenarios, the induced current in the loop
is identical; the observable phenomenon (the current)
depends only on the relative motion.
In summary, Einstein has shown that, for the
understanding of electrodynamics that prevailed at the
time, there are two physically distinct scenarios that are
completely indistinguishable observationally. The fact
that Einstein takes this to be unacceptable and uses the
induction experiment to motivate the development of a
physical model devoid of a notion of ether or absolute
rest, and wherein only the relative motion of objects is
physically significant (which is what the special theory
of relativity ultimately achieves) is an instance of his
endorsement of the Leibnizian methodological principle.
FIG. 1. The two scenarios considered by Einstein in his
discussion of the induction experiment.
3B. The equivalence principle
In his account of the equivalence principle, Einstein
considered the following two physical scenarios which
are understood to be physically distinct according to
Newtonian theory: (i) being at rest in a uniform
gravitational field that induces acceleration a in the
direction −nˆ, or (ii) accelerating with acceleration a
in the direction +nˆ through a space that is free
of gravitational fields. Einstein noted that these
two scenarios are observationally indistinguishable and
concluded that they should be considered physically
equivalent as well. As such, it is another clear example
of the application of Leibniz’s methodological principle.
Another version of the principle considers the
pair of scenarios to be: (i) freely falling in a
uniform gravitational field, and (ii) moving at fixed
velocity through a space that is free of gravitational
fields. Einstein’s conclusion about these is the
same: observational indistinguishability implies physical
equivalence.
The observational equivalence of scenarios (i) and
(ii) (for either version of the equivalence principle just
articulated) is most often explained these days by
invoking a thought experiment involving an observer
inside an elevator who is implementing experiments and
observing the outcomes, and by noting that nothing
that she observes therein will allow her to deduce
whether the elevator is at rest in a uniform gravitational
field or whether it is accelerating through free space
(alternatively, whether the elevator is freely falling in a
uniform gravitational field or whether it is moving at
constant velocity through free space). This is depicted in
Fig. 2.
 
i
ii
ii ii
p S
I ca
Al
 
i
ii
ii ii
p S
I ca
Al
FIG. 2. The two scenarios considered by Einstein in his
discussion of the equivalence principle.
To defend the claim that Einstein’s argument
did indeed conform to the Leibnizian methodological
principle, we consider some textual evidence from his
1911 article “On the influence of gravitation on the
propagation of light” [5]. Einstein imagines a system
of coordinates, K, that is stationary with respect to
a uniform gravitational field inducing acceleration a in
some direction, and another, K ′, moving with uniform
acceleration a in the opposite direction.
He notes that the form of the equations of motion of
a material object relative to K and relative to K ′ are
precisely the same. He further notes that while it is
obvious in K ′ that all material objects will experience
the same acceleration, in K, on the other hand, the
fact that they do is an instance of what he refers to as
“Galileo’s principle”, that is, the equality of gravitational
and inertial mass. Einstein then notes:
This experience, of the equal falling of all
bodies in the gravitational field, is one of
the most universal which the observation of
nature has yielded, but in spite of that the law
has not found any place in the foundations of
our edifice of the physical universe.
He then immediately suggests how the situation can be
remedied:
We arrive at a very satisfactory interpretation
of this law of experience, if we assume that
the systems K and K ′ are physically exactly
equivalent, that is, if we assume that we may
just as well regard the system K as being
in a space free from gravitational fields, if
we then regard K as uniformly accelerated.
This assumption of exact physical equivalence
makes it impossible for us to speak of
the absolute acceleration of the system of
reference, just as the usual theory of relativity
forbids us to talk of the absolute velocity of
a system; and it makes the equal falling of all
bodies in a gravitational field seem a matter
of course.
Einstein is here pointing out that one secures a
particularly satisfying account of the observational
equivalence of the two scenarios (indeed, one that he
describes as “a matter of course”) by following the
dictates of the Leibnizian methodological principles and
assuming their physical equivalence.
That it is indeed the observational equivalence of the
two scenarios which serves as the antecedent of his
argument is clear from the fact that he refers to the
equal falling of all bodies in a gravitational field as a
“law of experience” and something that “the observation
of nature has yielded”. The fact that the conclusion he
seeks to draw is the ontological equivalence of the two
scenarios is plain from the fact that he speaks explicitly
of their “exact physical equivalence”2. Furthermore, note
the similarity between Leibniz’s notion of two scenarios
2 This same terminology is used elsewhere when he is summarizing
the equivalence principle, for instance, in Ref.[6], “we [...] assume
the complete physical equivalence of a gravitational field and a
corresponding acceleration of the reference system.”
4being “the same thing by two names” and Einstein’s turn
of phrase “we may just as well regard the system K as
being in a space free from gravitational fields”.
We read all of this as Einstein arguing against the
ontological picture of reality assumed prior to general
relativity, wherein accelerations and gravitational field
strengths were considered absolute notions and wherein
the distinction between scenarios involving one or the
other were considered meaningful. He argues for
supplanting this picture with a new ontological scheme
wherein the distinction is abolished from the conceptual
apparatus of the theory (so that it becomes “impossible
for us to speak of the absolute acceleration of the system
of reference”). Indeed, this abolishment of the distinction
is ultimately achieved in his general theory of relativity.
Most importantly for our purposes here, in making his
argument, Einstein explicitly appeals to the intuition
underlying Leibniz’s methodological principle.
The notion that it is the equivalence principle (rather
than some other principle) that served as the primary
conceptual foundation on which the theory of general
relativity was built is supported by Einstein’s own
reminiscences concerning its origin (recounted in a talk
he gave in Kyoto in 1922 [7]):
The breakthrough came suddenly one day.
I was sitting on a chair in my patent office
in Bern. Suddenly the thought struck me:
If a man falls freely, he would not feel his
own weight. I was taken aback. This simple
thought experiment made a deep impression
on me. This led me to the theory of gravity.
Insofar as the equivalence principle is an instance of the
Leibnizian methodological principle, this establishes the
importance of the latter in the conceptual underpinnings
of general relativity.
C. The hole argument and the point coincidence
argument
In the years leading up to 1915, Einstein struggled
to complete the general theory of relativity. A key
issue was whether he should insist on the principle of
general covariance, that “Laws of Nature are expressed
by means of equations which are valid for all co-ordinate
systems, that is, which are covariant for all possible
transformations” [8]. The historical account that I
shall relay—which has emerged as the standard one
among historians and philosophers of science—originated
in the work of Stachel and of Norton [9, 10] (see also
Refs. [11, 12]).
In 1913, Einstein devised an argument which for
two years he took (mistakenly) to be evidence against
general covariance. This is the famous “hole argument”,
presented by Einstein in Sec. 12 of “On the Foundations
of the Generalized Theory of Relativity and the Theory
of Gravitation” [13]. Einstein considers a spacetime
containing matter but also a region Σ that is free of
matter—which he termed the ‘hole’. He then notes
that one can define diffeomorphisms (i.e., nonsingular
coordinate transformations) which act as identity outside
of the hole but act nontrivially within the hole. It
follows that one can identify different solutions (relative
to a single coordinate system K) for the field inside
the hole—he denotes them G(x) and G′(x)—for a fixed
distribution of matter outside the hole. Einstein puts it
as follows:
[...] assume the differential equations of
the gravitational field to be everywhere
covariant [...] There are then two different
solutions G(x) and G′(x) relative to K,
even though the solutions coincide on the
boundary of the domain Σ. In other words,
the course of events in this domain cannot
be determined uniquely by general-covariant
differential equations.
Unwilling to abide nonuniqueness of the course of events,
Einstein concludes that one must introduce restrictions
on the choice of coordinate system and hence retreat from
demanding general covariance.
Einstein only finds the flaw in his argument two years
later and he comes to the conclusion that the two
different solutions do not represent physically distinct
states of affairs and therefore that there is no challenge
to the uniqueness of the physical course of events in the
hole. He reports his new conclusion for the first time
in a letter to Ehrenfest of December 26, 1915 [14]. The
letter is explicitly a retraction of his former argument. 3
It proceeds as follows:
A contradiction to the uniqueness of the
events does not follow at all from the fact that
both systems G(x) and G′(x), related to the
same frame of reference, satisfy conditions of
the gravitational field. [...]
In place of Sec. 12, the following consideration
must appear. Whatever is physically real
in events in the universe (as opposed to
that which is dependent on the choice of a
reference system) consist in spatio-temporal
coincidences) and in nothing else! For
example, the intersection points of two world
lines are real, or the statement that they do
not intersect each other. Therefore, those
statements relating to the physically real
do not lose validity from the absence of a
(unique) coordinate transformation. When
two systems in the gµν ’s (or generally, the
variables used to describe the world) are
3 As Einstein himself quips in the letter: “Einstein has it easy.
Every year he retracts what he wrote in the preceding year; now
the sorry business falls to me of justifying my latest retraction.”
5constituted in such a way that the second
can be obtained from the first by mere
space-time transformation, then they are
entirely equivalent. This is because they
have in common all the spatio-temporal point
coincidences, that is, all the observables.
This consideration shows simultaneously how
natural the requirement of general covariance
is.
This has come to be known as Einstein’s
point-coincidence argument.
I now draw out explicitly how this constitutes an
endorsement of the Leibnizian methodological principle.
The hole argument stipulates two solutions that are
represented differently in the mathematical formalism;
the question arises, however, of whether or not they
should be considered to be physically distinct.
Einstein ultimately answers the question in the
negative by appealing to facts about what is observable.
Specifically, he argues that because the only aspects of a
solution that are observable are space-time coincidences
and because coordinate transformations do not alter
such coincidences, the two mathematical solutions
considered in the hole argument are observationally
indistinguishable in principle. 4
From this, he concludes that the two solutions must be
physically equivalent. He is therefore making an inference
from observational indiscernibility to ontological identity.
Overcoming the hole argument reaffirmed Einstein’s
confidence that the general theory of relativity should
be generally covariant. It proved to be a decisive
step for it was not long afterwards that he formulated
the final version of general relativity. Therefore, we
again find Leibniz’s methodological principle to have
played a critical role in Einstein’s development of general
relativity.
For the case of the point coincidence argument (unlike
the cases of the induction experiment and the equivalence
principle), the connection to Leibniz’s philosophy has
been noted before. Earman and Norton [16] point out
that the space-time substantivalist must allow “that
there are distinct states of affairs which no possible
observation could distinguish,” and they note that this
is the thesis that Leibniz emphatically argued against in
his correspondence with Clarke. Although they do not
explicitly describe the denial of this thesis as a version
of Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles,
4 Indeed, in a letter to Michelle Besso of January 3rd, 1916, [14]
Einstein gives essentially the same account of his error that
he provided to Ehrenfest, and (according to the translation by
Howard in Ref. [15]) is explicit about the relevant notion being
in-principle observability: “If, e.g., physical events were to be
built up solely out of the movements of material points, then
the meetings of the points, i.e., the points of intersection of
their world lines, would be the only reality, i.e., observable in
principle.”
preferring instead to refer to the particular instance of it
required for the hole argument as “Leibniz equivalence”,
it is clear that to deny “that there are distinct states of
affairs which no possible observation could distinguish” is
to affirm that in-principle empirical indistinguishability
implies ontological identity, which is the version of
Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles that
I have been focussed on in this work.
Note, however, that Ref. [16] describes Einstein’s
temporary endorsement of the hole argument as “tacitly
eschewing Leibniz Equivalence”. This assessment seems
incorrect to me. Such a conclusion would only be
warranted if Einstein had in that period also endorsed the
notion that the two scenarios under consideration were
observationally equivalent. However, this is precisely
what Einstein missed prior to 1915. Only when he
recognized that the observational facts consisted solely
of the point coincidences, so that the two scenarios
were observationally equivalent after all, was he inclined
to the opinion that they must be describing the same
physical state of affairs and to conclude that demanding
general covariance did not imply any nonuniqueness for
the physical state of affairs inside the hole. Both before
and after this realization, Einstein’s views were consistent
with the Leibnizian methodological principle. In other
words, when one takes into account how he describes
his mistake as a mistake regarding the observational
discernibility of two scenarios, it becomes clear that
his temporary endorsement of the hole argument does
not indicate any tacit eschewment of the Leibnizian
methodological principle, but rather constitutes further
evidence of his commitment to it.
D. A historical question
An interesting historical question is whether one can
trace Einstein’s endorsement of Leibniz’s methodological
principle back to Leibniz (either by direct or indirect
influences), or whether perhaps Einstein conceived of it
independently. I argue that, on balance, the historical
evidence suggests the former.
Einstein was intimately familiar with the debate on
whether motion is absolute or relative, and therefore
he was likely to have come across Leibniz’s explicit use
of the methodological principle is his argument against
absolute space (such as the thought experiment wherein
everything is shifted in space). Indeed, he refers explicitly
to the debate in the foreword he wrote for Max Jammer’s
book “Concepts of Space” [17] (in 1953, two years before
his death). Einstein begins by setting out the standard
dichotomy between concepts of space, as: “(a) space as
positional quality of the world of material objects; (b)
space as container of all material objects.” He applauds
Newton’s endorsement of the concept (b) on the grounds
that this was the only position that could be adequately
justified in Newton’s time:
The concept of space was enriched and
6complicated by Galileo and Newton, in that
space must be introduced as the independent
cause of the inertial behavior of bodies if
one wishes to give the classical principle of
inertia (and therewith the classical law of
motion) an exact meaning. To have realized
this fully and clearly is in my opinion one of
Newton’s greatest achievements. In contrast
with Leibniz and Huygens, it was clear to
Newton that the space concept (a) was not
sufficient to serve as the foundation for the
inertia principle and the law of motion. He
came to this decision even though he actively
shared the uneasiness which was the cause
of the opposition of the other two: space
is not only introduced as an independent
thing apart from material objects, but also is
assigned an absolute role in the whole causal
structure of the theory. This role is absolute
in the sense that space (as an inertial system)
acts on all material objects, while these do
not in turn exert any reaction on space.
He concludes, however, that Leibniz and Huygens’
position was the correct one, and that even though they
could not adequately justify it, their intuitions were
well-founded:
The fruitfulness of Newton’s system silenced
these scruples for several centuries. Space of
type (b) was generally accepted by scientists
in the precise form of the inertial system,
encompassing time as well. Today one
would say about that memorable discussion:
Newton’s decision was, in the contemporary
state of science, the only possible one, and
particularly the only fruitful one. But the
subsequent development of the problems,
proceeding in a roundabout way which no
one then could possibly foresee, has shown
that the resistance of Leibniz and Huygens,
intuitively well founded but supported by
inadequate arguments, was actually justified.
This is consistent with the notion that Einstein endorsed
Leibniz’s use of the methodological principle as a
criticism of position (a). The particular “inadequacy”
in Leibniz’s arguments to which Einstein here refers is
likely a reference to the lack of a satisfactory account
of the apparent empirical discernibility of unaccelerated
and accelerated motions relative to absolute space (for
instance, in the case of Newton’s bucket experiment).
Indeed, Leibniz’s response to the bucket experiment in
the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence bears no resemblance
to the response one sees to be the correct one in
retrospect given relativity theory. Indeed, it was not
until Mach’s analysis of the bucket experiment [18] that
one has even the semblance of an adequate argument for
position (a).
In addition to any direct influences of Leibniz on
Einstein, there are many candidates for intellectual
mediaries, individuals who were themselves directly
influenced by Leibniz and who in turn influenced
Einstein.
Henri Poincare´ is one such individual. In “Science
and Hypothesis”, published in 1902, Poincare´ argued
that because changes to the scale of the universe (i.e.,
global rescalings) led to no observable effects, they should
not be considered physical. Specifically, in defending
the relativity of space [19], he mentions the following
argument (which he attributes to Delboeuf):
Suppose that in one night all the dimensions
of the universe became a thousand times
larger. The world will remain similar to itself,
if we give the word similitude the meaning it
has in the third book of Euclid. Only, what
was formerly a metre long will now measure
a kilometre, and what was a millimetre long
will become a metre. the bed in which I went
to sleep and my body itself will have grown
in the same proportion. when I wake in the
morning what will be my feeling in face of
such an astonishing transformation? Well, I
shall not notice anything at all. The most
exact measures will be incapable of revealing
anything of this tremendous change, since the
yard-measures I shall use will have varied in
exactly the same proportions as the objects
I shall attempt to measure. In reality the
change only exists for those who argue as
if space were absolute. If I have argued for
a moment as they do, it was only in order
to make it clearer that their view implies a
contradiction. In reality it would be better
to say that as space is relative, nothing at all
has happened, and that it is for that reason
that we have noticed nothing.
The example of the universe suffering a global rescaling
overnight is so obviously similar to Leibniz’s example
of global translations mentioned earlier (and also of
his other famous examples of global boosts and of
flipping East into West), that it is hard to believe
that Poincare´ was not aware of the similiarity in the
argumentation style. Indeed, Poincare´ was very familiar
with Leibniz’s work. In 1880, for instance, the french
edition of Leibniz’s Monadology, prepared by E´mile
Boutroux, included a supplementary note at the end by
Poincare´ comparing Descartes’ and Leibniz’s conceptions
of dynamics [20]. He also collaborated in preparing the
international edition of the works of Leibniz [21].
Meanwhile, it is also known that Einstein was reading
Poincare´ in the years leading up to the development of
the special theory of relativity5 and so this is one avenue
5 This occurred in the context of discussions of physics and
7by which Einstein would have become acquainted (or
reacquainted) with this Leibnizian argumentation style.
III. RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS OF THE
PRINCIPLE
A criticism of Leibniz’s methodological principle that
I sometimes hear is that to endorse it is to embrace a
purely empiricist philosophy of science and hence a denial
of realism.
I have responded to this charge in another article [2],
so I simply repeat the response here:
Such a principle does not force us to
operationalism, the view that one should only
seek to make claims about the outcomes of
experiments. For instance, if one didn’t
already know that the choice of gauge in
classical electrodynamics made no difference
to its empirical predictions, then discovery of
this fact would, by the lights of the principle,
lead one to renounce real status for the
vector potential in favour of only the electric
and magnetic field strengths. It would not,
however, justify a blanket rejection of any
form of microscopic reality.
As another example, consider the prisoners
in Plato’s cave who live out their lives
learning about objects only through the
shadows that they cast. Suppose one
of the prisoners strikes upon the idea
that there is a third dimension, that
objects have a three-dimensional shape,
and that the patterns they see are just
two-dimensional projections of this shape.
She has constructed a hidden variable model
for the phenomena. Suppose a second
prisoner suggests a different hidden variable
model, where in addition to the shape,
each object has a property called colour
which is completely irrelevant to the shadow
that it casts. The methodological principle
dictates that because the colour property
can be varied without empirical consequence,
it must be rejected as unphysical. The
shape, on the other hand, has explanatory
power and the principle finds no fault with
it. Operationalism, of course, would not
even entertain the possibility of such hidden
variables.
philosophy with Maurice Solovine and Conrad Habicht (their
self-proclaimed “Olympia Academy”). Specifically, in his
reminiscences of Einstein, Solovine provided a list of the readings
that served as the basis of their discussions, which included
Poincare´’s “Science and Hypothesis” (Introduction to vol. 2 of
Einstein’s collected papers, Ref. [14], pp. xxiv-xxv).
A variant of the criticism described above is
that the Leibnizian principle implies a commitment
to a particularly implausible doctrine of empiricism.
Specifically, it is suggested (at least in the context of the
debate on the nature of space) that it amounts to nothing
more than the verifiability criterion of meaningfulness of
the logical positivists (see, e.g., Ref. [3], pp. 173-174),
and consequently that the known deficiencies of the latter
cut against it as well.
For instance, Earman and Norton [16] link the
plausibility of the Leibnizian methodological principle
to that of the doctrine of verificationism. Referring
to the dilemma faced by spacetime substantivalists
between (a) denying ‘Leibniz equivalence’ (i.e., denying
the Leibnizian methodological principle applied to the
case of the hole argument) and (b) giving up spacetime
substantivalism, they state that “with the demise of
the verifiability criterion of meaning, it is no longer
unfashionable for them to escape the dilemma by simply
allowing (a)”.
But the two principles are not equivalent. Although
both make reference to observational indiscernibility of
some pair of propositions, in the case of verificationism,
such indiscernibility is taken as a sufficient condition
for judging the propositions meaningless, while in the
case of the Leibnizian methodological principle, such
indiscernibility is merely taken as grounds for the
implausibility of any ontological theory wherein they are
taken to describe physically distinct possibilities.
For instance, consider the examples of the application
of the Leibnizian principle by Einstein that we have
reviewed in this article. Each example provides
a criticism of an ontological theory that posits
scenarios that are physically distinct but observationally
indiscernible. The ether theory of electromagnetism
is the target of the criticism in the case of the
induction experiment, while it is the Newtonian theory
of gravitation in the case of the elevator thought
experiment. Does Einstein take the deficiency of these
ontological theories to be that they are meaningless? No.
He criticizes them on the grounds that they fail to provide
a satisfactory explanation of the relevant observational
equivalence. 6
The Leibnizian methodological principle is best
understood as an inference to the best explanation.
The best explanation of the fact that two scenarios
are in-principle observationally indiscernible is that
they are associated to the same physical state of
affairs. For instance, in the case of his comparison of
an accelerating frame of reference and a frame fixed
relative to a gravitational field, recall what Einstein says
6 Note, furthermore that in light of Einstein’s heavy use of the
Leibnizian methodological principle, the claim that this principle
is equivalent to the doctrine of verificationism is in tension with
the fact that positivism cannot do justice to Einstein’s philosophy
of science.
8about explaining their empirical indiscernibility by their
physical identity: the latter supposition makes the former
fact (specifically, the observation of the equal acceleration
of all bodies in a gravitational field) “a matter of course”.
In Poincaree´’s use of the Leibnizian methodological
principle to argue for the unphysicality of global
rescalings of space (discussed above), it is even more
explicit that he takes the principle to be justified (in
part at least) as an inference to the best explanation:
“as space is relative, nothing at all has happened, and
that it is for that reason that we have noticed nothing.”
(emphasis added).
Leibniz’s justification of the principle of the ontological
identity of empirical indiscernibles in terms of his
principle of sufficient reason [1] may also be viewed as
a characterization of the former principle as an inference
to the best explanation. Specifically, this holds if one
understands Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason as a
commitment to the idea that good explanations do not
contain arbitrary elements, that is, elements for which no
reason can be given for them being one way as opposed
to another. (We will pursue this idea further in Sec. V.)
Some commentators suggest that the Leibnizian
methodological principle, though useful as a means of
selecting among competing ontological theories, should
not be taken as a constraint on theory construction. This
is the position that is suggested by Maudlin’s discussion
of the Newton-Leibniz debate in Ref. [22]. Although he
opines that “one should be made at least uncomfortable
by the postulation of empirically inaccessible physical
facts,” and consequently that “[other things being
equal], one would prefer a theory without them”, he
nonetheless grants that theories violating the Leibnizian
methodological principle are still viable on the grounds
that “Man is not a measure of all things, and there is no
reason to believe that all real properties must fall within
the power of human observation.”
I do not find this argument persuasive because the
Leibnizian methodological principle does not appeal to
a parochial kind of empirical indiscernibility, judged
relative to the particular in-born capabilities of humans
or their particular technological capabilities at a given
historical moment, but rather to the in-principle
variety of empirical indiscernibility. This variety of
indiscernibility must be understood as indiscernibility for
any system that might be considered an agent within
the universe. This is because, as Deutsch has argued
persuasively [23], the only in-principle limits to human
capabilities are the limits imposed by physics7, and
therefore the only limits on our capabilities are the
limits on the capabilities of any system embedded in the
universe and subject to its physical laws.
7 His argument proceeds by noting that an “in-principle human
capability” includes what could be achieved in a distant future
with the aid of arbitrarily sophisticated technology.
Note, furthermore, that the in-principle variety of
empirical indiscernibility is meaningful even in the
absence of any agents whatsoever. It is perfectly
meaningful to assert that two scenarios could not in
principle be discerned empirically (by the lights of some
ontological theory) even in some early or late epoch of
the universe where there were no agents about. This is
because an ontological theory specifies the limits on the
discerning capacities of any system that could exist in
the universe by its lights, regardless of whether there are
in fact any agents existing.
Finally, note that espousing Leibniz’s methodological
principle is not equivalent to denying the possibility of
the underdetermination of physical theory by empirical
evidence. Rather, it is a denial of a particular kind
of underdetermination. If, within a given ontological
theory, there is an element that can be varied without
leading to any variation in observable phenomena (even
in principle), then this is an underdetermination of
features of that ontological theory by the empirical
evidence, and it is this sort of underdetermination
that is considered unacceptable by the Leibnizian
methodological principle.
IV. PRIOR ART ON THE METHODOLOGICAL
PRINCIPLES AT PLAY IN EINSTEIN’S WORK
In this section, I will consider what a few previous
authors have said concerning the methodological
principles underlying Einstein’s thought, and to what
extent such claims are in agreement with the one made
in this article.
A. The work of Elie Zahar
Elie Zahar, in attempting to articulate the
methodological principles to which Einstein was
committed (he termed them heuristic principles),
described one such principle as follows [24]:
All observationally revealed symmetries
signify fundamental symmetries at the
ontological level. Hence the heuristic rule:
replace any theory which does not explain
symmetrical observational situations as the
manifestation of deeper symmetries [...].
If one interprets “observationally revealed symmetries”
as invariances of the observations under putative
changes to the ontological state, then this statement
is essentially equivalent in content to the statement of
the Leibnizian methodological principle that I provided
earlier in this article. This interpretation of Zahar’s
statement, therefore, supports our claim about Einstein’s
methodological commitments. Note, however, that
Zahar does not make explicit the connection with the
philosophy of Leibniz.
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Julian Barbour has previously argued in favour of the
thesis that Leibnizian ideas underlie Einstein’s work. In
particular, he has argued that one can understand many
of Einstein’s methodological commitments as instances
of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. For instance,
he writes [25]:
If you read through Einstein’s papers in
which he battled his way to the creation
of his general theory of relativity, you will
see that the spur that kept him going was,
in fact, the principle of sufficient reason.
Indeed, he carried on directly from where
Leibniz was forced by his untimely death to
leave the issue. As Einstein never ceased
to point out, Newton’s use of absolute
space was tantamount, in modern terms, to
the introduction of distinguished frames of
reference (for the formulation of the laws
of nature) under conditions in which it was
completely impossible to find any reason
why they should be distinguished. Einstein
found this to be an affront to the principle
of sufficient reason, and was therefore led
to say that no such distinguished frames
of reference can exist, or, rather, that all
conceivable frames must be equally good for
the formulation of the laws of nature. This
was his principle of general relativity—and
what a harvest it eventually yielded. That,
I think, is enough justification for taking
Leibniz seriously.
As noted in Sec. III, one can understand Leibniz’s
principle of the identity of indiscernibles (qua constraint
on theory construction) as a particular instance of his
principle of sufficient reason. Insofar as the hole and
point-coincidence arguments and the arguments from the
induction experiment and the equivalence principle are
instances of the former, they can also be understood
as instances of the latter. In this sense, I agree with
Barbour’s assessment that Einstein was motivated to
uphold Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason.
Nonetheless, in my view, Barbour’s summary does
not fully capture the precise role that the principle of
sufficient reason plays in Einstein’s work. Einstein only
appeals to the principle of sufficient reason, I claim,
as a way of justifying the plausibility of the principle
of the ontological identity of empirical indiscernibles.
Specifically, he appeals to it in justifying the notion
that good explanations do not invoke arbitrary elements,
that is, elements for which no reason can be given
why they are one way rather than another. But his
endorsement of the principle of relativity — in particular,
the hypothesis that the laws of physics should take the
same form in an accelerated frame as they do in an
inertial frame with a gravitational field — cannot be
explained as merely a consequence of his dissatisfaction
with theories containing arbitrary elements, and so the
principle of sufficient reason does not by itself explain
Einstein’s endorsement of the sameness of the laws in
the two frames. Rather, it is this principle supplemented
with the observed fact of the empirical indiscernibility of
phenomena in the two frames that Einstein took to be the
justification for assuming the sameness of the ontological
laws that operate in the two frames.
In other words, I take Barbour’s summary of Einstein’s
reasoning to be incomplete insofar as it leaves out the
important role of empirical observations (as opposed to
merely rationalist considerations). Once their role is
acknowledged, in the manner I have just outlined, it
becomes clear that the particular form of the principle
of sufficient reason that is at play is the principle of the
ontological identity of empirical indiscernibles.
C. The work of Don Howard
Don Howard has argued [15] that a central aspect of
Einstein’s methodology is what he calls the Eindeutigkeit
principle, which he takes Einstein to have picked up
from the work of Joseph Petzoldt.8 Howard attempts
to articulate the principle in various different ways in
his article. One such articulation appears to me to be
cognate with Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason9:
Petzoldt gives the example of a stationary
ball on a flat, horizontal, frictionless surface
being struck, straight on, by a moving ball. In
what direction will the stationary ball recoil?
The only possibility is for it to recoil in the
same direction in which the incident ball was
moving, because for any other conceivable
direction, say ten degrees to one side of the
incident ball’s path, one can find another
direction, thus ten degrees to the other side,
that would be equally justified.
The language of “equally justified options” here is what
is reminiscent of Leibniz’s description of the lack of a
sufficient reason to prefer one option over another.
The Leibnizian methodological principle defended in
this article is a normative principle for the manner in
which ontological theories ought to secure explanations
of empirical phenomena, and it constrains empirical
observations only insofar as it constrains the ontological
theories one should be willing to consider as viable
8 The german term “Eindeutigkeit” can be translated to
“unambiguity”, although Howard seems to prefer the
synonymous but more obscure term “univocalness” in most of
his work.
9 Howard does make the connection to Leibniz’s philosophy insofar
as he notes that the Eindeutigkeit principle is reminiscent of the
Leibnizian conception of mathematics.
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options. Specifically, it asserts that the only viable
options are those ontological theories that are not part
of a slate of alternatives that are ontologically distinct
but empirically equivalent. In Howard’s example of the
application of the Eindeutigkeit principle to the collision
experiment, the principle is also used to argue in favour
of the ontological theory that is not part a slate of
alternatives (by eliminating all theories wherein the ball
is deflected by some nontrivial angle on the grounds
that each such theory is part of a pair of theories with
opposite deflection angles). But the slate of alternatives
being considered in the collision experiment is a set
of alternative ontological theories that lead to different
empirical phenomena (because the angle of deflection of
the ball is observable).
In other words, even if the Eindeutigkeit principle
can be understood as an instance of Leibniz’s principle
of sufficient reason, it is clearly not a restatement of
the principle of the ontological identity of empirical
indiscernibles insofar as it is not used to rule out
ontological theories on the grounds of their having
some element that can be varied without any empirical
consequences. In my view, therefore, Howard’s reading
of Einstein’s use of Leibniz, like Barbour’s, does not
do justice to the role of the empirical phenomena in
Einstein’s arguments. The discussion in the next section
will provide further support for this conclusion.
V. EINSTEIN’S OWN ACCOUNT OF HIS
METHODOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS
To what extent did Einstein himself articulate the
Leibnizian methodological principle when describing his
own commitments? This is the question to which we turn
in this section,
In his Autobiographical notes [26], Einstein at one
point sets out to “say something general” about “the
points of view from which physical theories may be
analyzed critically at all.” He distinguishes two of these.
“The first point of view is obvious: the theory must
not contradict empirical facts.”10 “The second point
of view is not concerned with the relationship to the
observations but with the premises of the theory itself,
with what may briefly but vaguely be characterized as
the ‘naturalness’ or ‘logical simplicity’ of the premises
(the basic concepts and the relations between these).”
Regarding the distinction between the two points of view,
he states: “The second point of view may briefly be
characterized as concerned with the ‘inner perfection’ of
10 He qualifies this dictum by noting that its application is
“delicate” on account of the fact that “it is often, perhaps
even always, possible to retain a general theoretical foundation
by adapting it to the facts by means of artificial additional
assumptions”, an endorsement of the thesis espoused by
Duhem [27] and later by Quine [28].
the theory, whereas the first point of view refers to the
‘external confirmation.’ ”
He mentions several methodological commitments that
fall under the umbrella of the second point of view. For
example, he endorses a preference for theories that have
greater specificity of predictions: “among theories with
equally ‘simple’ foundations, that one is to be taken
as superior which most sharply delimits the otherwise
feasible qualities of systems (i.e., contains the most
specific claims).”11
But of the commitments he articulates, the one that is
of most relevance to the thesis of the present work is the
following [26]:
The following I reckon as also belonging to
the “inner perfection” of a theory. We prize
a theory more highly if, from the logical
standpoint, it does not involve an arbitrary
choice among theories that are equivalent and
possess analogous structures.
I will refer to this as Einstein’s Wir scha¨tzen
statement.12
Some points to note. Einstein is here articulating
a criterion for theory-preference that is not simply the
criterion of empirical adequacy because he explicitly
situates the criterion under the second point of view,
which pertains not to “external confirmation” but
“internal perfection”. Thus when he compares on the
one hand
(i) a theory that is one of a slate of theories that are
“equivalent and possess analogous structures”,
to, on the other hand,
(ii) a theory that is not of this sort,
the two alternatives under consideration cannot be
distinguished in terms of empirical adequacy.
Einstein states that we ought to prefer option (ii), the
theory that is not selected as one among a slate of theories
that are “equivalent” and “possess analogous structures.”
Here, “equivalent” obviously cannot be interpreted
as precise identity of the theories under consideration
because then it would be impossible for their structures
to be merely analogous and there would be no choice to
make among them (not even an arbitrary one). It must
be a weaker notion of equivalence. It must be strong
enough, however, to imply empirical equivalence, for
otherwise it would be possible in principle to distinguish
11 From a modern perspective, it is natural to gloss this statement
as a preference for theories that are more falsifiable relative to
competitors which are less specific. It is worth remembering that
Karl Popper’s falsifiability criterion was in part inspired by the
example of Einstein’s revolutionary work in physics.
12 This is the german phrase corresponding to “We prize” in the
Schilpp translation of the Autobiographical notes [26].
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the theories on the slate in terms of their empirical
adequacy and Einstein has explicitly stipulated that
this criterion is not to be situated under the “external
confirmation” of a theory but rather its “internal
perfection” So it is reasonable to interpret the notion
of equivalence at play here as one that implies empirical
equivalence. Indeed, it is reasonable to interpret it simply
as empirical equivalence.
How shall we conceive the property of “possessing
analogous structures”? If the meaning of “equivalence”
of the theories in the slate is indeed empirical equivalence,
then the structures to which Einstein is referring cannot
be purely empirical structures because if they were, they
would not have been merely analogous in these structures
but identical. Thus the structures in question must refer
to nonempirical aspects of the theory, that is, physical or
ontological aspects.
Under this reading, Einstein is asking us to consider
a slate of theories that are empirically equivalent but
that posit non-identical (though analogous) ontological
structures. And he is asserting that each theory in
such a slate is made implausible by the fact that one
cannot choose a single theory among them without this
choice being arbitrary. It seems appropriate, therefore,
to consider Einstein’s statement here as an endorsement
of the ontological identity of empirical indisernibles.
A comment of Einstein’s shortly following the Wir
scha¨tzen statement provides further support for such
a reading. Einstein brings up his methodological
commitments to set the stage for his critique of mechanics
as the basis of physics. After discussing critiques based
on empirical adequacy, he turns to the second, “interior”
point of view. He then makes the following remark [26]:
In today’s state of science, i.e., after the
abandonment of the mechanical foundation,
such a critique retains only a methodological
relevance. But such a critique is well suited
to show the type of argumentation that, in
the selection of theories in the future, will
have to play an ever greater role the more
the basic concepts and axioms are removed
from what is directly observable, so that the
confrontation of the implication of theory by
the facts becomes constantly more difficult
and more drawn out.
What is pertinent here is his reference to the degree
by which “the basic concepts and axioms are removed
from what is directly observable.” This provides further
evidence that, in the description of his methodology,
Einstein is explicitly concerned with the problem
of bridging between the empirical evidence and the
ontological theory.
Following this remark, he gives the critique of
mechanics from the second point of view. His critique
focusses on the preference given to inertial systems
over other rigid coordinate systems in the Newtonian
conception of physics. Criticizing this preference fits the
mold of the Wir scha¨tzen statement by virtue of the
fact that among all rigid coordinate systems, picking out
the inertial systems as preferred is an arbitrary choice.
Here, Einstein is appealing to the fact it is possible to
express the laws of physics in the same manner relative
to all rigid coordinate systems, and that the empirical
predictions are the same for all choices. This is just
an appeal to the Leibnizian methodological principle
of the sort that we’ve seen already in our discussion
of the equivalence principle. The only difference is
that Einstein does not merely focus on the empirical
indistinguishability of an accelerating frame in free space
and an inertial frame with a uniform gravitational
field, but on the empirical indistinguishability of any
rigid coordinate system with some corresponding inertial
coordinate system and gravitational field.
So the critique of mechanics which he provides as an
example of his methodological principle at work is aptly
characterized as an argument based on the principle of
the ontological identity of empirical indiscernibles.
Finally, it is worth asking how Einstein means to
judge in-principle empirical indiscernibility. In my
statement of the Leibnizian methodological principle, I
have explicitly stated that it ought to be judged by
the lights of the ontological theory. Such an attitude
towards how indiscernibility is to be judged is consistent
with Einstein’s own statements about his philosophy of
science, in particular, his famous dictum that “what is
observable is determined by the theory” and his general
endorsement of Duhem’s thesis that all observations are
theory-laden (see footnote 10 and Ref. [29]).
In summary, Einstein’s own account of one of his
methodological principles seems to conform to the
Leibnizian methodological principle as I have articulated
it here. Certainly, the Wir scha¨tzen statement reads
quite well as an attempt to describe what is common to
the arguments of his that we reviewed in this article: the
induction experiment, the equivalence principle, and the
hole and point-coincidence arguments. Nonetheless, one
can certainly imagine Einstein having provided a better
summary of the Leibnizian methodological principle if
this is what he intended. Indeed, it is particularly notable
that he did not add qualifiers that the equivalence he
was referring to was empirical, nor that the “analogous
structures” were ontological.
It is also worth noting, however, that the Wir
scha¨tzen statement is followed immediately by Einstein
apologizing for not providing more detail [26]: “I shall not
attempt to excuse the lack of precision of the assertions
contained in the last two paragraphs on the grounds of
insufficient space at my disposal; I must confess herewith
that I cannot at this point, and perhaps not at all,
replace these hints by more precise definitions. I believe,
however, that a sharper formulation would be possible.”
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VI. DISCUSSION
A. The relevance of the Leibnizian methodological
principle in physics today
Thus far, I have sought to make the case for
the Leibnizian methodological principle based on its
historical track record. Given the heavy use that Einstein
made of the principle in formulating the conceptual
pillars on which the theory of Relativity was built, its
credentials are already seen to be quite impressive. In
light of this, I believe that physicists would do well to
form the habit of considering what the principle entails.
It involves a particular application of operational facts
in the service of realism which is rather different from
the methodological commitments of most physicists. I
therefore turn now to the question of what the Leinibizian
methodological principle can do for physics today.
For one, various contentious issues in the foundations
of physics can be usefully reexamined from the
perspective of this principle. As an example, the
deBroglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum theory has
been criticized on the grounds that it requires the
existence of an absolute rest frame, even though, by the
lights of the theory, this frame can never be determined
by any observation. Anyone who endorses this criticism
has intuitions in line with the Leibnizian methodological
principle.13 There are in fact many aspects of pilot-wave
theories that are underdetermined by the empirical data,
as noted in Ref. [2], and, therefore, by the lights of this
principle, each of these constitutes a reason for being
skeptical of this interpretational approach. (A proponent
of the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation has some recourse,
however, as discussed in the next section.)
The principle is also pertinent to the study of
noncontextuality in quantum theory. In Ref. [30],
I proposed a generalization of the notion of
noncontextuality espoused by Kochen and Specker [31] to
one that is applicable to any operational theory and any
type of experimental procedure therein. This principle,
understood as applying to all types of experimental
procedures and termed generalized noncontextuality, is
motivated in a manner that is precisely analogous to the
Leibnizian methodological principle (see, e.g., Appendix
A of Ref. [32]). There is a subtlety however: to properly
understand the principle of generalized noncontextuality
as a special case of the Leibnizian methodological
principle, it is necessary to reconceive the latter at the
level of epistemology. That is, rather than conceiving of
it as an inference from the indiscernibility of empirical
facts to the identity of ontological facts, one must
conceive of it as an inference from the indiscernibility of
states of knowledge about empirical facts to the identity
of states of knowledge about ontological facts. A detailed
13 I thank Matt Leifer for the example.
discussion is beyond the scope of this work (see, however,
Ref. [33]).
I pause to address a potential argument against the
Leibnizian methodological principle that arises from its
connection to noncontextuality. Specifically, sceptics of
the principle could take the fact that quantum theory
does not admit of a generalized-noncontextual ontological
model as evidence against the principle of generalized
noncontextuality and hence also as evidence against
the Leibnizian methodological principle. To see that
the argument need not lead one to having scepticism
of the principle, it suffices to note that generalized
noncontextuality is not the only assumption of the
no-go theorem and consequently that one can preserve
generalized noncontextuality (and hence the Leibnizian
methodological principle) by giving up a different
assumption. In my opinion, this is in fact the right
attitude to take towards the no-go result. Specifically,
I believe that it is the framework of ontological models
that must be abandoned, and that it is a fruitful research
programme to seek an alternative to this framework
that provides causal explanations of quantum statistics
while strictly respecting the Leibnizian methodological
principle [2, 34–36].
More generally, the principle may well reveal
important deficiencies in our current approach to
theory construction in physics. In Ref. [2], I argued
that a commitment to it implies that the distinction
between kinematics and dynamics—which is central
to theory-construction in physics today—is unphysical
and that only a kind of union of the two (somehow
capturing causal relations alone) can have ontological
significance. This is the sort of novel conception of
the ontological account of phenomena that I alluded
to above as a potential alternative to the standard
framework of ontological models. At the very least, such
a conception provides a fresh perspective on the problem
of understanding the ontological claims of quantum
theory, a project which I firmly believe is critical to the
progress of modern physics.
B. A middle ground in the debate between realists
and empiricists
Researchers investigating the foundations of physics
tend to polarize into two camps, corresponding to the
divide between realist and empiricist philosophies of
science. This is particularly true in the foundations of
quantum theory, where a kind of schism has developed
between the most enthusiastic proponents of each of the
two communities. In this section, I will argue that
to endorse the Leibnizian methodological principle is
to stake out a middle ground between empiricism and
realism. Specifically, I will argue that an endorsement
of the principle removes the most problematic features
of each camp’s position and therefore serves to draw
researchers on both ends of this ideological divide towards
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the centre
A criticism that can be levelled against realists
is that the ontological theories they entertain are
underdetermined by the empirical evidence. For
concreteness, consider a realist who is enthused by
the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum theory.
An operationalist may criticize such a researcher’s
position (rightly in my view) by noting that there are
many possible theories that fit the mold of pilot-wave
interpretations, and that these different theories vary in
their ontological commitments but are not distinguished
by the empirical evidence [2].
Suppose such a realist decides to endorse the
Leibnizian methodological principle. Call them a
“Leibnizian Bohmian”. If they do so, then they must
agree that this type of underdetermination is indeed
problematic insofar as it explicitly violates the principle.
Nonetheless, they can still defend a research program
that espouses the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation on the
grounds that future empirical evidence could distinguish
between the different versions of the theory. Indeed,
to stay true to the principle, they must grant that
were future empirical evidence not to distinguish these
versions, then this would be grounds for abandoning the
approach. Furthermore, they should be motivated to
actively seek out such evidence.
It seems to me that Antony Valentini is a proponent of
the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation of this type given that
he has responded to the underdetermination criticism
of pilot-wave theories in precisely this fashion [37].
Furthermore, the version of pilot-wave theories that he
espouses [38–40] — wherein there is the possibility of
divergence between the initial probability distribution
over the configuration space of the Bohmian particles
and the modulus squared of the wavefunction — is
unlike the usual version insofar as it makes empirical
predictions that are different from those of standard
quantum theory. It is therefore possible in principle to
have differences of empirical predictions among instances
of the theory that vary in their ontological commitments.
Valentini’s research program is to try and identify exotic
physical scenarios that can reveal such differences, and
consequently that could deliver a verdict on which
pilot-wave theory in a slate of such theories is the correct
one. Although I am not personally enthused by the
prospects of this program, I prefer it to the standard
version of the pilot-wave program precisely because it
does not conflict with the Leibnizian methodological
principle.
Conversely, a criticism that can be levelled against
the empiricists is that their set of mental tools is too
impoverished. The idea is that in order to make progress
in physics, one has no choice but to entertain ontological
hypotheses, expressed with concepts that are not defined
purely in terms of empirical phenomena (Einstein’s “free
inventions of the human mind”).14
An empiricist who endorses the Leibnizian
methodological principle can address this criticism
without conceding too much to the realist by stipulating
that ontological hypotheses should only be entertained
when these are subservient to empiricist priorities.
Specifically, they can concede that it is valuable to
entertain an ontological hypothesis but only if there is
no element of that hypothesis that can be varied without
empirical consequence.
To use the example of the prisoners in Plato’s cave
mentioned earlier, the Leibnizian empiricist can retreat
from a position of admitting no hidden variables to a
position of admitting only those hidden variables that
are analogous to the shapes of the objects casting the
shadows on the cave wall while still rejecting as idle
metaphysics any hidden variables that are analogous to
the colours of the objects.
C. Physics and philosophy
The question of which methodological principles might
best promote scientific progress belongs primarily to the
philosophy of science. But the question is critical for
the progress of physics. Indeed, of all the assumptions
that might differentiate a physicist from their peers,
their methodological principles are the most important
because they affect the complexion of everything else
that they assume and the true worth of their labours will
ultimately be determined by the veracity and fruitfulness
of that starting point.
I suspect that some physicists may be sceptical of this
idea because they imagine that physics can be pursued
fruitfully without presuming any particular philosophical
commitments. I believe that such scepticism is
fundamentally mistaken, for reasons that have been
articulated before. Dennett expresses the rebuttal to this
view particularly well [41]:
[...] there is no such thing as philosophy-free
science. There is only science whose
philosophical baggage is taken on board
without examination.
14 Einstein himself made precisely this criticism against those
empiricists who were skeptical of the reality of atoms (he names
Ostwald and Mach in particular) [26]:
The hostility of these scholars toward atomic theory
can undoubtedly be traced back to their positivistic
philosphical attitude. This is an interesting example
of the fact that even scholars of audacious spirit and
fine instinct can be hindered in the interpretation of
facts by philosophical prejudices. The prejudice —
which has by no means disappeared — consists in
the belief that facts by themselves can and should
yield scientific knowledge without free conceptual
construction.
14
Moreover, it is telling that all the truly significant
revolutions in physics were accompanied by upheaval in
the philosophy of science. In other words: the physicists
who were true revolutionaries could not afford to be
philosophically na¨ıve.
For any reader who needs further persuasion of the
importance to physics of methodological principles in
general (and the Leibnizian methodological principle in
particular), I advise reflection on the question of why it
was Einstein rather than Poincare´ who discovered the
special theory of relativity. As Isaacson has elegantly
put it in his biography of Einstein [42]: “If this seems
surprising [that it was Einstein, not Poincare´], it is
because we underestimate the boldness of Einstein in
stating the principle of relativity as an axiom and, by
keeping our faith with it, changing our notion of space
and time.” I agree with this sentiment. Indeed, a similar
sort of answer could be given to the question of why it was
Einstein who discovered the general theory of relativity
rather than any other physicist who had come to learn
of the special theory. However, in answering either
question, the principle to which I would point as the one
constituting Einstein’s central axiom is the Leibnizian
methodological principle for theory construction, for the
reasons that I have articulated in this article. In my view,
it was the fact that Einstein kept his faith in this principle
that ultimately set him apart from his contemporaries in
the account of history.
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